Abstract. We present TRACER, a verifier for safety properties of sequential C programs. It is based on symbolic execution (SE) and its unique features are in how it makes SE finite in presence of unbounded loops and its use of interpolants from infeasible paths to tackle the path-explosion problem.
Introduction
Recently symbolic execution (SE) [15] has been successfully proven to be an alternative to CEGAR for program verification offering the following benefits among others [12, 18] : (1) it does not explore infeasible paths avoiding expensive refinements, (2) it avoids expensive predicate image computations (e.g., Cartesian and Boolean abstractions [2] ), and (3) it can recover from too-specific abstractions as opposed to monotonic refinement schemes often used. Unfortunately, it poses its own challenges: (C1) exponential number of paths, and (C2) infinite-length paths in presence of unbounded loops.
We present TRACER, a SE-based verification tool for finite-state safety properties of sequential C programs. Informally, TRACER attempts at building a finite symbolic execution tree which overapproximates the set of all concrete reachable states. If the error location cannot be reached from any symbolic path then the program is reported as safe. Otherwise, either the program may contain a bug or it may not terminate. The most innovative features of TRACER stem from how it tackles (C1) and (C2).
In this paper, we describe the main ideas behind TRACER and its implementation as well as our experience in running real benchmarks. Lazy means that the tool starts from a coarsely abstracted model and then refines it while eager is its dual, starting with the concrete model and then removing irrelevant facts. CEGAR-based tools [1, 4, 7, 10, 21] are the best examples of lazy approaches while SE-based tools [12, 18] are for eager methods. Special mention is required for hybrid approaches such as YOGI [20] , CPA-CHECKER [3] , and KRATOS [5] . YOGI computes weakest preconditions from symbolic execution of paths as a cheap refinement for CEGAR. One disadvantage is that it cannot recover from toospecific refinements (see program diamond in [18] ). CPA-CHECKER and KRATOS encode loop-free blocks into Boolean formulas that are then subjected to an SMT solver in order to exploit its (learning) capabilities and avoid refinements due to coarser abstractions often used in CEGAR. On the other hand, the performance of interpolation-based verifiers depends on the logical strength of the interpolants 1 . In lazy approaches, a weak interpolant may contain spurious errors and cause refinements too often. Stronger interpolants may delay convergence to a fixed point. In eager approaches, weaker interpolants may be better (e.g., for loop-free fragments) than stronger ones since they allow removing more irrelevant facts from the concrete model.
State-Of-The-Art Interpolation-Based Verification Tools
TRACER performs SE computing efficient approximated weakest preconditions as interpolants. To the best of our knowledge, TRACER is the first publicly available (paella. d1.comp.nus.edu.sg/tracer) verifier with these characteristics.
How TRACER Works
Essentially, TRACER implements classical symbolic execution [15] with some novel features that we will outline along this section. It takes symbolic inputs rather than actual data and executes the program considering those symbolic inputs. During the execution of a path all its constraints are accumulated in a first-order logic (FOL) formula called path condition (PC) . Whenever code of the form if(C) then S1 else S2 is reached the execution forks the current symbolic state and updates path conditions along both the paths: P C 1 ≡ P C ∧C and P C 2 ≡ P C ∧¬ C. Then, it checks if either P C 1 or P C 2 is unsatisfiable. If yes, then the path is infeasible and the execution halts backtracking to the last choice point. Otherwise, it follows the path. The verification problem consists of building a finite symbolic execution tree that overapproximates all concrete reachable states and proving for every symbolic path the error location is unreachable.
The first key aspect of TRACER, originally proposed in [13] for symbolic execution, is the avoidance of full enumeration of symbolic paths by learning from infeasible paths computing interpolants [8] . Preliminary versions of TRACER [12, 13] computed interpolants based on strongest postconditions (sp). Given two formulas A (symbolic path) and B (last guard where infeasibility is detected) such that A ∧ B is unsat, an interpolant was obtained by ∃x · A where x are A-local variables (i.e., variables occurring only in A). However, unlike CEGAR, TRACER starts from the concrete model of the program and then deletes irrelevant facts. Therefore, the weaker the interpolant is the more likely it is for TRACER to avoid exploring other "similar" symbolic paths. This is the motivation behind an interpolation method based on weakest preconditions (wp). Example 1. The verification of the contrived program in Fig. 2(a) illustrates the need for wp as well as the essence of our approach to mitigate the "path-explosion" problem. Fig. 2(b) shows the first symbolic path explored by TRACER which is infeasible. ( * ) means that the evaluation of the guard can be true or false. After renaming we obtain the unsatisfiable constraints For efficiency, TRACER under-approximates the weakest precondition by a mix of existential quantifier elimination, unsatisfiable cores, and some heuristics. Whenever an infeasible path is detected we compute ¬ (∃y · G), the postcondition that we want to map into a precondition, where G is the guard where the infeasibility is detected and y are G-local variables. The two main rules for propagating wp's are: 2 A symbolic state σ is subsumed or covered by another symbolic state σ ′ if they refer to same location and the set of states represented by σ is a subset of those represented by σ ′ . Alternatively, if σ and σ ′ are seen as formulas then σ is subsumed by
Rule (A) replaces all occurrences of x with e in the formula Q. The challenge is how to produce efficient (conjunctive) formulas from rule (B) as weak as possible to increase the likelihood of subsumption. During the forward SE when an infeasible path is detected we discard irrelevant guards by using the concept of unsatisfiable cores (UC) 3 to avoid growing the wp formula unnecessarily. For instance, the formula C ⇒ wp(S1, Q) can be replaced with wp(S1, Q) if C ∈ C where C is a (not necessarily minimal) UC. Otherwise, we underapproximate C ⇒ wp(S1, Q) as follows. Let
, where existential quantifier elimination removes the post-state variables x ′ . A very effective heuristic if the resulting formula is disjunctive is to delete those conjuncts that are not implied by C because they are more likely to be irrelevant to the infeasibility reason. Fig 2(a) . Fig. 3(a) shows the same first symbolic path explored by TRACER 
Example 2. Coming back to the program in
where V is the set of all program variables (including renamed variables), and ι 6 : s 1 ≤ 9 is obtained by wp(s 2 = s 1 + 1, s 2 ≤ 10) = s 1 ≤ 9. Fig. 3(b) shows the second symbolic path but note that the path can be now subsumed at location 7 since the symbolic state s 0 = 0 ∧ s 1 = s 0 + 1 ∧ s 2 = s 1 + 2 |= s 2 ≤ 10. Dashed edges represent subsumed paths and are labelled with "subsumed". Finally, Fig. 3(c) illustrates how the third symbolic path can be also subsumed at location 4 since s 0 = 0 ∧ s 1 = s 0 + 2 |= s 1 ≤ 9. TRACER proves safety again but the size of the symbolic tree is now linear on the number of branches.
⊓ ⊔
With unbounded loops the only hope to produce a proof is abstraction. In a nutshell, upon encountering a cycle TRACER computes the strongest possible loop invariants Ψ by using widening techniques in order to make the SE finite. If a spurious abstract error is found then a refinement phase (similar to CEGAR) discovers an interpolant I that rules the spurious error out. After restart, TRACER strengthens Ψ by conjoining it with I and the symbolic execution checks path by path if the new strengthened formula is loop invariant. If this test fails for a path π, then TRACER unrolls π one more iteration and continues with the process. Notice that the generation of invariants is dynamic in the sense that loop unrolls will expose new constraints producing new invariant candidates. For lack of space, we refer readers to [12] for technical details. Here, we illustrate how TRACER handles unbounded loops through the classical example described in Fig 4(a) . Example 3. TRACER executes the program until a cycle is found and checks whether a certain set of loop candidates holds after the execution of the cycle. We obtain the symbolic path π 1 ≡ lock 0 = 0 ∧ new 0 = old 0 + 1 ∧ (new 0 = old 0 ) ∧ lock 1 = 1 ∧ old 1 = new 0 from executing the else branch, shown in Fig. 4(b) . Assume a widening ∇ defined as c ∇ c 
The path π 1 after widening is shown in Fig. 4(c) . Note that the symbolic state at the loop header is true, and as a result, we can stop executing and avoid unrolling the path π 1 forever since the child (second occurrence of location 1) is subsumed by its parent (first occurrence of 1). We then backtrack to a second path π 2 from executing the then branch. For π 2 , the candidates are indeed invariants but this is irrelevant since the execution of π 1 already determined that they were not invariant. As a result of the loss of precision of our abstraction, the exit condition of the loop (new 0 = old 0 ) (Fig. 4(d) ) is now satisfied and the error location is reachable by the path π 3 ≡ (new 0 = old 0 ) ∧ (lock 0 = 0). Then, a refinement is triggered. First, we check that π 3 is indeed spurious due to the loop abstraction (i.e., lock 0 = 0
Second, by weakest preconditions we infer an interpolant I ≡ new 0 = old 0 that suffices to rule out the counterexample. Third, we strengthen our loop abstraction true with I, record that I cannot be abstracted further, and restart.
After restart, the execution of π 1 shown in Fig. 4 (e) cannot be halted at location labelled with B since (new 0 = old 0 + 1) ∇ (old 1 = new 0 ) is still true but this abstraction does not preserve new 0 = old 0 , the interpolant from the refinement phase. As a result, we are not allowed to abstract the candidate new 0 = old 0 + 1 at location A and thus the path must be unrolled one more iteration. However, the unrolled path will not take the loop body anymore but follow the exit condition propagating the constraints lock 1 = 1 ∧ new 1 = old 0 . Hence, the unrolled path is safe. Finally, we explore π 2 from the then branch shown in Fig. 4(f) . Fortunately, we can stop safely the execution of π 2 (as before) since no abstraction is needed for this path and hence, new 0 = old 0 is preserved. As a result, the state of the child C is subsumed by its ancestor A.
⊓ ⊔
Remarks.
It is known that wp may fail to generalize with some loops as Jhala et al. pointed out in [14] . TRACER can be fed with other interpolation methods and/or with inductive invariants from external tools (see Sec. 3). Also, our path invariant technique via widening is closely related to the widening "up to" S ( ∇ S ) used in [9] , where S contains the constraints inferred by the refinement phase. However, they use it to enhance CEGAR while SE poses different challenges (see [12] Sec.1, Ex.3). Finally, we would like to emphasize that abstraction in TRACER differs from CEGAR in a fundamental way. TRACER attempts at inferring the strongest loop invariants modulo the limitations of widening techniques while CEGAR, as well as hybrid tools like CPA-CHECKER and KRATOS, will often propagate coarser abstractions. Although stronger abstractions may be more expensive they may converge faster in presence of loops (see [12] Sec.1, Ex.4). where Cond is a quantifier-free FOL formula. Then, each path that encounters the assertion tests whether Cond holds or not. If yes, the symbolic execution has reached an error node and thus, it reports the error and aborts if the error is real, or refines if spurious. Otherwise, the symbolic execution continues normally.
Usage and Implementation
Output. If the symbolic execution terminates and all TRACER abort assertions failed then the program is reported as safe and the corresponding symbolic execution tree is displayed as the proof object. If the program is unsafe then a counterexample is shown. Fig. 5 outlines the implementation of TRACER. It is divided into two components. First, a C-frontend based on CIL [19] translates the program into a constraint-based logic program. Both pointers and arrays are modeled using the theory of arrays. An alias analysis is used in order to yield sound and finer grained independent partitions (i.e., separation) as well as infer which scalars' addresses may have been taken. Optionally, INTERPROC [16] (option -loop-inv) can be used to provide loop invariants. The second component is an interpreter which symbolically executes the constraint-based logic program and it aims at demonstrating that error locations are unreachable. This interpreter is implemented in a Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) system called CLP(R) [11] . Its main sub-components are:
Implementation.
• Constraint Solving relies on the CLP(R) solver to reason fast over linear arithmetic over reals augmented with a decision procedure for arrays (option -mccarthy).
• Interpolation implements two methods with different logical strength. The first method uses strongest postconditions [12, 13] ′ |= c otherwise true. Very importantly, if ∇ attempts at abstracting a constraint needed to exclude an error then it fails and the path is unrolled at least one more iteration. Although our experiments show that our method for discovering loop invariants is fast and effective, it is incomplete (in the sense that it may cause non-termination) for several reasons. First, the generation of candidates considers only constraints propagated by SE although TRACER allows enriching this set with inductive invariants provided by INTERPROC. Second, the implementation of ∇ is fairly naive. Third, ∇ is applied to each candidate individually. By applying ∇ to all candidate subsets we could produce richer invariants, although this process would be exponential.
Experience with Benchmarks
We ran TRACER on the ntdrivers-simplified and ssh-simplified benchmarks from SV-COMP (sv-comp.sosy-lab.org) and compare with two state-of-the-art tools: CPA-CHECKER [3] and HSF [21] . Fig. 6 shows the results of this comparison including the impact on TRACER using strongest postconditions (SP) and weakest preconditions (WP) as interpolants. Columns 2 and 3 compare the number of states of the symbolic execution tree (#S) explored by TRACER using SP and WP, and columns 4 and 5 compare the number of loop invariant refinements made (#R) using SP and WP. The rest of the columns show total time in seconds T (including compilation time) of TRACER (SP and WP), CPA-CHECKER (CPA), and HSF (HSF). For a fair comparison, TRACER did not use invariants from INTERPROC. ∞ indicates TRACER did not finish within 900 seconds.
Our results indicate that the use of WP pays off with greater gains in programs where TRACER refines heavily, mainly because loop unrolls are expensive for SE, and hence subsuming more often is vital. were about 10-15 times more compared to WP. Compared with HSF, a "pure" CEGAR verifier, TRACER out-performed it in the ntdrivers-simplified benchmarks (first 4 rows) and was out-performed in the rest. This suggests that CEGAR may behave better when numerous loop unrolls are needed and SE may be more suitable when most of the infeasible paths affect safety (where CEGAR would perform many refinements). Comparing with CPA, a hybrid verifier and winner of SV-COMP'12, TRACER fares almost equally in the ntdrivers-simplified benchmarks and s3 srvr programs, but is out-performed in the s3 clnt benchmarks. Nevertheless, our evaluation demonstrates that TRACER is competitive with state-of-the-art verifiers.
